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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this appeal
was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 744.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellees West respond to Appellant Case's statement of issues as follows
(the issues are restated verbatim from the Brief of Appellant):
Issue No. 1 - Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of
law, Plaintiffs/Appellees were entitled to an order quieting title in and to the
Subject Property in them, free and clear of any claim of Defendant/Appellant.
Response: This issue was not preserved below. Although subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this question does not pertain to subject
matter jurisdiction but to the sufficiency of the pleadings, which issue was not
raised or preserved below. Therefore, there is no proper ground for review of this
issue.
Issue No, 2 - Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of
law, Defendant/Appellant was in breach of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract
through her refusal to convey, on behalf of the May 6, 1993 trust for the January
21, 1999 trust any interest in and to the Subject Property, notwithstanding
Appellee's failure to pay taxes on the Subject Property during the contract period

1

as required by the terms of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract, thus entitling
Plaintiff/Appellees to specific performance of the contract and an award of costs
and attorneys fees.
Response: Appellees are satisfied with Appellant's Statement of Issue No.
2; therefore, no response is required.
Issue No, 3 - Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of
law, Georgia Lamar West had waived Appellee's obligation to [pay] taxes on the
Subject Property during the period of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Response: Appellants incorrectly state that the standard of review for this
issue is one of correctness. The correct standard of review is that a reviewing
court grants "very broad discretion to the trial court's application of legal
propositions to the facts in waiver cases." Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890
P.2d 7, 10 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d
61, 65 (Utah App. 1994)).
Case also raises the secondary issue of whether the trial court erred by
granting equitable relief to the Wests under the doctrine of unlean hands. See
Brief of Appellant, p. 22. This issue is not reviewed for correctness but "is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion." Hone v. Hone. 2004 UT App 241, f 9;
see also McKeever v. Fiore. 829 A.2d 846, 852 (Conn.App.Ct. 2003) ("The

2

application of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court.").
Issue No, 4 - Whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law,
that Defendant/Appellant was the successor-in-interest to the Georgia Lamar
West and/or the Estate of Georgia Lamar West, and therefore obligated under the
1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Response: Appellees are satisfied with Appellant's Statement of Issue No.
4; therefore, no response is required.
Issue No. 5 - Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant oral
argument on summary judgment.
Response: This issue should be: Whether the lower court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant oral argument on summary judgment. This issue
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT
App 291, f 9 ("a trial court may exercise its discretion to require compliance with
the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly rule 4-501")
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(3)(C):
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the
time of filing the principle memorandum in support of or in opposition
3

to a motion may file a written request for a hearing... such request
shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition
to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Claudia Case (hereafter "Case") appeals summary judgment entered in favor
of Arnold and Mary West (hereafter "the Wests").
Course of Proceedings
On December 28, 1999, the Wests filed a Complaint in the Fourth District
Court for Utah County, Provo Department. (R. 15.) West sought to quiet title to
the Subject Property and brought claims for breach of contract and slander of title.
(R. 15.) On July 25, 2000, the Wests moved for partial summary judgment. (R.65.)
On September 6, 2000, the court denied that motion in a written ruling. (R.237.)
On September 15, 2000, the Wests moved the court to clarify that ruling, raising
several issues. (R. 241.)
Disposition in the Trial Court
On October 2, 2000, the trial court, in a memorandum decision, granted the
Wests' motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 247.) The trial court awarded
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the Wests their costs and attorneys fees in the amounts of $6,302.50 (R. 287) and
$1,537.50 (R. 347) for a total award below of $7,840.00.
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
1.

In early 1987, the Wests entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract

with Georgia Lamar West for the purchase of certain real property in American
Fork, Utah (referred to herein as "the Subject Property"). (R. 182.)
2. Contemporaneous with the execution of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, Lamar West executed a Warranty Deed in favor of the Wests on April 8,
1987. (R. 181.)
3. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Lamar West
agreed to sell the Wests the following described real property:
Parcel 2; Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line
and 333.45 feet South from the American Fork City monument at the
centerline intersection of 300 West street and 300 North street; thence
North 84° 30' West 30.00 feet; thence South 16° 59' 15" West 176.14
feet to the North Right-of-Way line of Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
thence South 63° 23* East 89.29 feet along said Right-of-Way line;
thence North 0° 25' East 205.68 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 0.25 acres.
Parcel 3; Beginning 378.50 feet west along the monument line
and South 333.45 feet from the American Fork City monument at the
intersection of 300 North st.; thence South 0 25'00" West 205.58 feet
to the north Right-of-Way line of the Union Pacific Railroad Co.;
thence South 63° 23'00" East 55.40 feet along said Right-of-Way line;
5

0° 25' East 225.61 feet along a fence line; thence North 84° 30,00n
West 49.91 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 0.246 acres.
(R. 181.)
4. The legal description of property contained in the Warranty Deed
executed by Lamar West on April 8, 1987 is identical to that of the legal
description contained in paragraph 2 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R.
181.)
5. Shortly after entering into the Uniform Real Estate Contract with Lamar
West, the Wests moved into the house located on the Subject Property and have
lived there ever since. (R. 180.)
6. Paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract states in relevant part:
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at
the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to execute and
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed
conveying the title to the above described premises free and clear of
all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have
accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer[.]
(R. 180.)
7. After the Uniform Real Estate Contract and Warranty Deed were
executed by the parties, the Warranty Deed was placed in escrow, first with First
Security Bank and then with Weststar Escrow, Inc., with the understanding that the
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Wests would make monthly payments to the escrow company on their contractual
obligation, and that once they had completed making the payments, the Warranty
Deed would be released to them for recording. (R. 180.)
8. The real property that was the subject of this transaction was a portion of
a larger parcel of property owned by Lamar West that she divided for purposes of
this transaction. (R. 180.)
9. On May 6,1993, at a time the Warranty Deed was still being held in
escrow, Lamar West formed the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 with herself
as Trustee, and executed and recorded a Quit-Claim Deed, conveying to herself as
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust the larger parcel of property that included the real
property that was subject of the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into with the
Wests, excepting from this conveyance the piece of property designated as "Parcel
2" in the Uniform Real Estate Contract and Warranty Deed, with the piece
designated as "Parcel 3" now included in the trust. (R. 179-180.)
10. In March, 1998, The Wests fulfilled their obligation to Lamar West on
the Uniform Real Estate Contract by making their final payment to the escrow
company, and received a release of the Warranty Deed from the escrow company.
(R 179.)
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11. Plaintiffs recorded the Warranty Deed, but were told by the Utah
County Recorder that the grantor was improperly vested because a portion of the
property conveyed by the Warranty Deed was held by the Lamar West Trust and
the grantor on the Deed was Lamar West individually, not Lamar West as Trustee
of the Lamar West Trust. (R. 179.)
12. Plaintiffs sought to have Lamar West execute a corrected Warranty
Deed but she refused. (R. 179.)
13. On November 20, 1997, Lamar West amended Section 7.6 of the Lamar
West Trust to provide that Case and Bettie Joe Nerdin West would be successor cotrustees of the trust. (R. 178.)
14. On January 21, 1999, Lamar West created the Georgia Lamar West
Trust, which document amended in its entirety the Lamar West Trust dated May 6,
1993 and any other trust she may have had. (R. 178.)
15. This trust designated Lamar West and Case as co-trustees, and
designated Case as successor trustee upon the death of Lamar West. (R. 178.)
16. The trust was established to administer Lamar West's estate after her
death and contains provisions to accomplish that purpose. (R. 178.)
17. In March, 1999, Lamar West died and Case became Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999. (R. 178.)
8

18. The Wests then sought to have Case execute a proper Warranty Deed
pursuant to the terms of the uniform Real Estate Contract but she refused. (R. 178.)
19. Paragraph 22 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract states:
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply
to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and
assigns of the respective parties hereto.
(R. 177.)
20. Case, as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust, is the successor in
interest to Lamar West's interest in property she held as Trustee of that trust. (R.
177.)
21. On June 9, 1999, Case as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6,
1993, executed and recorded a Quit-Claim Deed to herself as Trustee of the
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, which deed contained a legal
description of real property that included and encompassed the property that was
the subject of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and Warranty Deed executed by
Lamar West in favor in The Wests in early 1987. (R. 177.)
22. Co-Trustee Betty Joe Nerdin West did not participate in the conveyance
represented by the June 9, 1999 Quit-Claim Deed. (R. 177.)
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23. Case claims that the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999
presently owns the real property that was the subject of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract entered into between Lamar West and The Wests. (R. 176-177.)
24. The Wests have never received a clear title to the real property they
purchased pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract they entered into with
Lamar West and the Warranty Deed they received from her. (R. 176.)
25. Paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract states.
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in
any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered
hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by the
statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing
a suit or otherwise.
(R. 176.)
26. Lamar West paid all of the property taxes on the real property that was
the subject of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and Warranty Deed executed by
herself and the Wests in early 1987 for the time period that the Warranty Deed was
held in escrow. (R. 233.)
27. Paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract at issue states:
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the
Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment of payments
10

when the same shall become due, or within thirty days hereafter, the
Seller at his option shall have the following alternative remedies.
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to
remedy the default within five days after written notice, to be released
from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and
all payments which have been made theretofore on this contract by the
Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller
may at his option re-enter and take possession of said premises
without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with
all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the
said additions and improvements shall remain with the land become
[sic] the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at
will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all
delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's fees. (The use
of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at
his option, from resorting to one of the other remedies hereunder in the
event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon
written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract
as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer subject thereto, and
proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds
applied to the payment of the balance owing, including costs and
attorney's fees, and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency
which may remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder,
upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to the
appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged
property and collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply
the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same
pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment
of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of the said premises
during the period of redemption.
(R. 232-233.)
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28. Neither Lamar West nor Case have ever exercised any rights provided
by paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract as a result of an alleged
default by The Wests, and have specifically never provided any notices required by
paragraph 16 of the contract to the Wests. (R. 231-232.)
29. On several occasions over the course of several years, Lamar West told
the Wests and Betty Jo West that she would pay the property taxes on the property
for the time that the Warranty Deed was in escrow and that The Wests should not
worry about paying the property taxes. (R. 231.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over quiet title actions.
The actions of the trial court were proper in that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and summary judgment in favor of the Wests was proper. The trial
court erred in its refusal to hear oral argument, but such error was not an abuse of
discretion and therefore not reversible error.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
THE WESTS'QUIET TITLE CLAIM.
A.

Case's attempt to raise subject matter jurisdiction is actually a
challenge aimed at the sufficiency of the pleadings, which was not
raised in the trial court and therefore not preserved for appeal.
12

Case artfully attempts to argue that a party's alleged failure to state a claim
somehow divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. She
offers no legal support for this proposition other than citation to the quiet title
statute. It is clear, however, that the trial court does indeed have general subject
matter jurisdiction over a quiet title claim and that this is an improper attempt to
argue a motion to dismiss for the first time before this Court. See Chen v. Stewart.
2004 UT 82, f 36 ("One of the consequences of the non-waivable nature of subject
matter jurisdiction is that attempts are sometimes made to mischaracterize other
jurisdictional elements as defects in subject matter jurisdiction in order to revive an
otherwise belated objection.")(citations omitted).
Failure to state such a claim is simply a procedural deficiency that may be
cured, whereas lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be cured. In any event,
the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether the Wests properly stated a quiet title
claim was not raised below and should not be considered in this appeal. See Demet
v. Zeman. 486 P.2d 487, 87 Nev. 294, 299 (1971)("we decline to decide in the first
instance on appeal... the sufficiency of pleadings that have never been passed
upon by the lower court); Burem v. Harville. 174 S.W. 2d 663, 26 Term. App. 595,
603 (1943)("the complainant is not in a position to question the sufficiency of the
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pleadings in this [appellate] Court. No demurrer to or motion to strike any part of
the defendant's answer was filed in the lower Court.")
Case also failed to preserve this issue in the trial court. "In order to preserve
an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home
Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 47, f 14(citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d
844, 847 (Utah 1998)). The following three factors help determine whether the
trial court had such an opportunity: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority. Id.
Here, Case failed to specifically raise the sufficiency of the pleadings and
whether they stated a quiet title claim. Other than a general boilerplate defense
stated in the Answer, Case was silent on this issue below. Since this issue was not
even raised in a motion to dismiss or motion to strike, Case did not argue or
introduce any legal authority with respect to the quiet title claim. Because the issue
was not preserved below, this Court must pass on the invitation to consider the
sufficiency of the complaint for the first time on appeal.
B.

The Wests properly stated a quiet title claim before the trial court.
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Even if Case had preserved the issue of the sufficiency of the pleadings, it is
clear that the complaint stated a quiet title claim. While the legal authority cited by
Case is applicable, Case reaches an incorrect conclusion.
Case contends that the Wests failed to allege they held title to the Subject
Property and only sought to receive title under the real estate contract. While it is
correct that the Wests did seek specific performance of the contract between the
parties, the complaint also supports the allegation that the Wests held title to the
Subject Property and that such title should have been quieted in the Wests.
The complaint states as follows:
10.

In early 1998, Plaintiffs paid the purchase price for the
property in full, fulfilling their obligation under the
contract, and received the referenced Warranty Deed from
the escrow agent, which Warranty Deed was then
recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office on
April 14, 1998

31.

By executing the aforementioned Quit-Claim Deed and
by refusing to deliver a proper Warranty Deed to
Plaintiffs, Defendant has clouded the title to the real
property in question.

32.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an order quieting title in them to
the subject real property as it is described in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract and Warranty Deed they were
provided by Lamar West.

(R. 9 & 13). These allegations clearly establish a quiet title claim in that the Wests
claimed title to the Subject Property under the Warranty Deed that was duly
15

executed by Lamar West and later properly delivered to them by the escrow agent
pursuant to fulfillment of the escrow conditions. The Wests also alleged the
subsequent quit-claim deed was a cloud on their title. These allegations were
sufficient to state a quiet title claim.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
THE 1987 REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS PROPER.
Case contends that genuine issues of fact precluded the trial court's summary

judgment in favor of the Wests. The facts they alleged before the trial court,
however, do not establish any genuine issue of material fact as to waiver, or the
remedy of specific performance.
A.

The trial court's equitable order was proper as Case failed to
adequately support the "unclean hands" defense, which nevertheless
was vitiated by Lamar West's waiver of the provision she alleges was
breached.

The doctrine of "unclean hands1' is recognized in Utah but it has never been
held to be an absolute bar to recovery. Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22, f 42
(citations omitted). A district judge's application of the unclean hands doctrine is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion. IcL (citing Hone v. Hone. 2004 UT App
241 at f 9 ("For this reason, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
in concluding that the appellant does not come with clean hands.ff); see also

16

McKeever v. Fiore. 829 A.2d 846, 852 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) ("The application of
the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.").
In determining whether a party acted with unclean hands, the court will look
to the intent of the party, not the effect of its actions, and will only find unclean
hands present if there has been fraud or bad faith. Schivarelli v. Chicago Transit
Authority. 355 111. App. 3d 93, 103 (2005)(citation omitted). Here, Case failed to
present any evidence at trial to show any intent of fraud or bad faith on the part of
the Wests. The only basis for the unclean hands defense set forth by Case is the
allegation that the Wests failed to pay property taxes as required under the contract.
The trial court found, however, that that requirement was waived. Even if such
were not the case, Case has failed to show any bad faith or other actions that would
elevate the Wests' action from a mere alleged breach to inequitable action. Case's
defense of unclean hands is therefore unavailing as the Wests "did equity" at all
relevant times.
B.

The trial court properly found that Lamar West had waived the
property tax provision in the Contract.

Case contends that the trial court was incorrect in finding that Lamar West
had waived the Wests obligation under the Contract to pay property taxes on the
Subject Property. Case, however, failed to show any genuine issue of material fact
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as to waiver in the court below. Here on appeal, Case has failed to marshal the
evidence regarding waiver.
1.

Case failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to
Lamar West's waiver of the payment of property taxes
provision.

Case failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to waiver before the trial
court. The Wests, by affidavit or otherwise, established several facts with respect
to waiver that were uncontroverted by Case. The trial court initially denied the
Wests' motion for partial summary judgment because it believed there were factual
issues as to whether the Wests met the escrow conditions. After reconsideration,
the court realized that the only condition that was not met was the payment of
property taxes. The court then ruled that Lamar West had waived the property
taxes requirement. (R. 244-245).
Once a moving party (the Wests) has presented sufficient evidence to
support the claim for judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to provide evidence creating an issue of material fact.
According to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (in effect at the relevant
times herein), M[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
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partyfs statement." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B)(in effect during the
relevant time period). Therefore, "when the moving party has presented evidence
sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit
contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of
fact is present or would be at trial." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.,
2003UT23,f 40.
In the court below, Case only made general denials in response to the Wests'
contentions of undisputed fact. See R. 196-199. Those general denials, without
specifically controverting the facts pertaining to waiver, were insufficient to
establish a factual issue below and the trial court was justified in concluding that
no genuine issue of fact was present. On appeal, Case argues that Lamar West's
refusal to sign a corrective deed was evidence that she did not intend to waive the
Wests' payment of property taxes. There were no facts introduced below to
support this contention. Moreover, Lamar West's refusal was some time after
waiver had been accomplished, i.e., after Lamar West had paid the taxes, told the
Wests they would not have to pay the taxes, and refrained from exercising her
default rights under the Contract.
2.

The trial court's finding of waiver should be upheld because
Case has failed to properly marshal the evidence.
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Even if Case had specifically controverted the Wests' facts, she has failed to
marshal the evidence before this Court. In order to challenge a court's factual
findings, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding
even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v.
Stewart. 2004 UT 82, f 76 (citation omitted). Where a trial court's rulings on
highly fact-dependent issues are challenged, Utah appellate courts grant broader
than normal discretion to the trial court. Id (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936-38 (Utah 1994); Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935,
939-42 (Utah 1993) (recognizing waiver to be a factually sensitive issue requiring
the trial court's exercise of discretion in applying the law to facts).
Accordingly, where the legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, as it is
here, the appellant has the duty to marshal the evidence, k i Because Case has
failed to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should "accept the trial court's
findings on that basis alone." ML (citing Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94, f 26).
C.

The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded
below and was therefore waived.

For the first time on appeal, Case asserts a statute of frauds defense to the
trial court's finding that the real estate contract was modified so that Case was not
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obligated to pay property taxes on the Subject Property. The statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded or it is waived. See Utah R. Civ. P.
8(c); Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp.. 666 P.2d 876. 884 (Utah 19831 Case did not
plead the statute of frauds defense before the trial court. That defense was
therefore waived and should not be considered by this Court on appeal. See
Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 253 (Utah App. 1997).
D.

The modification at issue is excepted from the statute of frauds.

Even if Case had raised the statute of frauds defense below, it would not
have precluded enforcement of the modified agreement. Generally, if an original
agreement was required to comply with the statute of frauds, any material
modification of that agreement must also conform to the statute of frauds. Holt v.
Katsanevas. 854 P.2d 575, 580 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Allen v. Kingdon. 723
P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986)). In Allen, however, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized an exception to this general rule, "where a party has changed position
by performing an oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the
other party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement as unmodified."

In addition, transactions for the sale of realty may be exempted from the
statute of frauds where there is "sufficient performance on the part of [one party]
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exclusively referable to the alleged contract to exempt it from the effect of the
statute of frauds." Id (citing Ryan v. Earl 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980)). When an
oral contract otherwise prohibited by the statute of frauds becomes enforceable
because of part performance or otherwise, f,the Statute does not prevent
enforcement of the remaining promises." ML (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 147(2) (1979)).
Here, the modification, while otherwise prohibited by the statute of frauds,
became enforceable because of Lamar West's express waiver of the property tax
clause of the Contract and Lamar West's actual payment of the property taxes. The
modification is therefore excepted from the statute of frauds and was properly
enforced.
III.

CASE WAS PROPERLY FOUND IN BREACH OF THE 1987 REAL
ESTATE AGREEMENT.
Case contends that she was not a successor to the Contract and is therefore

not bound by it. The trial court found that a successor is merely one who succeeds
or takes the place of another. See R. 247 (quoting Park National Bank v. Travelers
Indemnity Co.. 90 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Mo. 1950). The court also relied on
Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Co., 888 P.2d 659, 663 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), stating that successors of the parties can only refer to those who
succeed to one party's interest in the contract through inheritance, assignment, or
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the like; and that Case had taken Lamar West's place with regard to the Contract
and had succeeded to her interest through "assignment, or the like." See R. 246.
Case is bound by the Contract as Lamar West's successor by virtue of being
the Trustee of her testamentary trusts. Simply because Lamar West conveyed a
portion of the contract property to herself as Trustee of her first trust by quit-claim
deed, does not change her or her estate's obligation to the Wests on the Contract.
Indeed, if Case's argument were true and she was not liable on the Contract,
an individual could: 1) enter into a contract to sell real property, 2) have a warranty
deed to the property held in escrow, 3) create a trust and convey the property to
herself as trustee of the trust by quit-claim deed; and thereby be free of any
obligation on the contract to convey the property. This result is unjust and should
not be condoned by the courts.
According to Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 719, pp. 323-324 (2d ed. 1982):
If the settler, prior to the creation of the trust, made a contract
with reference to the trust property, the trustee who later accepts the
trust is not liable upon the contract unless he expressly assumed
liability. The acceptance of the trust does not constitute an implied
assumption of the liabilities of the settlor with regard to the trust res.
But if the contract or conveyance of the settlor with regard to
the trust property not only created in personam obligations against the
settlor, but also fastened an in rem obligation on property which later
became the trust res, the trustee by accepting the trust takes it subject
to such in rem liabilities and has a duty in his representative capacity

23

to satisfy those liabilities out of trust property, and will be liable
personally for failure to perform his fiduciary duties in this respect.
Thus if a settlor has made an enforceable contract to sell
land and later transfers the realty to a trustee, the latter may be
held as trustee for specific performance of the settlor's contract by
reason of his ownership of the land and the fact that he is not a
bona fide purchaser of it, but he is not liable for damages at law for
failing to perform the contract.
(emphasis added).
The case of Hopkinson v. First Nat. Bank of Provincetown, 293 Mass. 570,
200 N.E. 381 (Mass. 1936) also provides direction. There, Hopkinson entered into
a contract with Linnell to purchase land, paid the purchase price, and received a
written promise from Linnell to provide him with a deed to the property at a later
time. Linnell died without delivering a deed to Hopkinson, although a deed had
been requested several times. The defendant bank was trustee of LinnelPs estate,
and as such, held title to the land that was subject of the Linnell-Hopkinson
contract. Hopkinson sued seeking specific performance of the contract.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held in favor of Hopkinson,
stating that "the bank as executor and devisee was a volunteer, and took subject to
the equitable duty of Linnell specifically to perform his contract with the plaintiff"
l± at 573 (citing Lykins v. McGrath. 184 U.S. 169 (1902)).
In the instant case as in Hopkinson, Case, as Trustee of Lamar West's
testamentary trusts, is bound by the contract Lamar West entered into with the
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Wests for the sale of the Subject Property, as Lamar West's successor to the
contract. These authorities show the key distinction is that Case is a successor by
virtue of her position as trustee of Lamar West's testamentary trust. The Court's
action in ordering specific performance was therefore proper and should be
affirmed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT IS
HARMLESS ERROR AND THEREFORE NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
Case contends that the trial court's refusal to hear oral argument constitutes

reversible error. That refusal, however, even if done in violation of the applicable
rule, is only harmless error. Harmless error is defined as an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings. Covey v. Covey. 2003 UT App 380, ^J21 (citing
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991)). Put in other words,
an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high
as to undermine confidence in the result. See kL On appeal, the appellant has the
burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial - that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id (citing
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct.App. 1991, affd.
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)).
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Here, Case has failed to meet her burden- to demonstrate that the trial
court's denial of oral argument was harmless or prejudicial, or that there is a
reasonable likelihood the denial affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Moreover, while the language of Rule 4-501 seems to mandate certain provisions
(using the word "shall"), numerous cases have established that "a trial court may
exercise its discretion to require compliance with the Rules of Judicial
Administration, particularly rule 4-501, without impairing a party's substantive
rights." Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, ^f 9 (citing, inter alia, Price v.
Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (1997)): see also Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139,112
(the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration "are not intended to, nor do they, create
or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent power of
the court to control matters pending before it").
In Price v. Armour, supra. Price argued on appeal that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment without a hearing. The trial court had granted a
hearing pursuant to rule 4-501(3) and then, without holding the hearing or
explaining why it did not hold a hearing, granted Armour's motion. Price argued, as
Case does here, that rule 4-501(3) required the court to grant a request for a hearing
on dispositive motions.
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The Utah Supreme Court held that the language of rule 4-501(3)(C) clearly
required that the trial court grant Armour's request for a hearing unless either of the
two exceptions applied. The Court found that the trial court erred in not holding
the hearing, but stated that
For such error to compel reversal of the trial court's substantive ruling,
however, it must have been prejudicial. If the error was harmless, that
is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the case, then a
reversal is not in order.
Price. 949 P.2d at 1255 (citing State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah
1997)).
The Court held that the error in not holding the hearing was not prejudicial
because:
The substantive issue before the trial court was purely one of law . . .
Price has not shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling
on the motion without a hearing. He has not shown that he would
have made new or additional arguments at the hearing that were not
covered by his memorandum of points and authorities. Indeed, on
appeal to this court the arguments made by Price in his appellate brief
and during oral argument are the same arguments that he made in his
memorandum before the trial court.
Here, the issues were mainly legal issues as Case failed to raise any genuine
issues of material fact. Case failed to show below that she would have raised new
arguments or factual issues. On appeal, she makes essentially the same arguments
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submitted to the court below. In sum, she has failed to show that the error of the
lower court was prejudicial. The actions of the trial court must therefore be
deemed harmless error.
V.

THE WESTS' SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES
INCURRED IF THEY PREVAIL ON APPEAL.
The Wests should be awarded their attorneys fees incurred for this appeal if

they prevail because they were awarded attorney's fees in the trial court below. (R.
287, 347.); Russell v. Thomas. 2000 UT App 82, ^ 16 (citing Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Wests respectfully request that the
actions of the trial court be affirmed in whole. In addition, the Wests request that
the Court award them their attorneys fees incurred for this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^OK day of August, 2005.
HANSEN & WRIGHT

JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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the foregoing to be sent via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH PC
170 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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